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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Cross-Appellee. 
Case No. 000301127 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
WHETHER THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH 
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH QUALIFIED FOR HOMESTEAD 
EXEMPTION ON MARCH 26,2001 WHEN A JUDICIAL LIEN 
SEIZED THE PROPERTY. 
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25 AND PAGE 20, LINES 1-18) 
1 
Issue 2 
WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD FILED ON 
MARCH 27, 2003 NULLIFIED THE JUDICIAL LIEN ORDERED AGAINST 
THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH 100 EAST, TOOELE, 
UTAH ON MARCH 26,2001. 
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25; PAGE 20, LINES 1-20; 
PAGE 22, LINES 8-13) 
Standard of Review: The standard of review of the above stated issues is for correctness, 
granting no deference to the trial judge's legal determinations. Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower, 959 
P.2d 115 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The cross-appellee was originally sued, civilly, for fraud. (Jerry Houghton, et al v. Glen E. 
Miller, Third District Court, Tooele County, Case No. 000301127) He later pled guilty, in criminal 
court, to eleven (11) counts of criminal fraud. (State of Utah vs. Glen E. Miller, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Case No. 001200550) (See Addendum 8, Page 18, Lines 1-4) In the above 
entitled civil case, a prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered by the court on March 26,2001 
(See Addendum 2), and it was recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's Office on June 15,2001. 
(See Addendum 4) 
On March 27,2003, the cross-appellee's wife recorded a document entitled Declaration of 
Homestead. (See Addendum 5) The trial court rendered judgment against the cross-appellee on 
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April 10, 2003 for $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6) 
Cross-appellants contend that the judicial lien, the prejudgment Writ of Attachment, ordered 
by the trial court and recorded on June 15, 2001, cannot be defeated by the cross-appellee 
subsequently selecting the property as his "then" homestead on or about March 27,2003, some two 
years after the attachment lien seized the property. (See Addendums 2 and 3.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In November of 2000, the cross-appellee, Glen E. Miller, was sued by the cross-
appellants for fraud. (See Addendum 1) 
2. The cross-appellee owned several parcels of real property, in particular "Parcel 3" 
as identified in Addendum 2. The street address of Parcel 3 is 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. 
3. On March 26, 2001, as an integral part of the ongoing civil case against the cross-
appellee, the Third District Court in and for Tooele County ordered a prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment, pursuant to Rule 64C (a) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, against "Parcel 3". 
(See Addendum 2) 
4. The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was actually signed by the Clerk of the Third 
District Court on April 17, 2001. (See Addendum 3) 
5. On June 15,2001, the judicially ordered and signed prejudgment Writ of Attachment 
Order was recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's Office at Book 687 and Page 21 with 
Recording Number 164906. (See Addendum 4) 
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6. On March 26, 2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered and 
shortly thereafter recorded, the cross-appellee was not living at or using the old house at 358 North 
100 East, Tooele, Utah as his "primary personal residence." The old house was then uninhabitable 
and provided no shelter or income. (See Addendum 8, Page 14, Lines 6-16; and Addendum 11, 
"Findings" at Paragraph 10.) In fact, on March 26,2001, cross-appellee's and his family's "primary 
personal residence" was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at 
Paragraphs 6 and 7) 
7. The cross-appellees's primary residence at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah was 
foreclosed upon in December of 2002. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 9.) In the early 
part of 2003, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the old house at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah 
in preparation of moving in. She did move in approximately March or May of 2003. (See 
Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 8.) Cross-appellee was previously sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison on or about March 27, 2002. (See Addendum 8, Page 21, Line 17-23 and Addendum 
11 at Paragraph 8.) 
8. On March 27, 2003, Mrs. Miller filed a "Declaration of Homestead" against 358 
North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. (See Addendum 5.) 
9. On April 10, 2003, the Third District Court entered a Judgment against the cross-
appellee in the amount of $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6.) 
10. On May 1, 2003, in connection with the prejudgment Writ of Attachment ordered 
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March 26,2001, the Third District Court issued a Writ of Execution and a Praecipe against the house 
located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, ordering a sheriff's sale toward satisfying the cross-
appellant's judgment (See Addendum 7.) 
11. Cross-appellee opposed the sheriff s sale because his wife had subsequently moved 
into the house and filed a "Declaration of Homestead" on March 27,2003. A hearing was held on 
August 4, 2003. (See Addendum 8, Transcript.) The trial court ruled that cross-appellee and his 
wife had a homestead exemption in the old house in the amount of $40,000.00, but would not stay 
the sale of the house because its value exceeded the value of the alleged homestead exemption. (See 
Addendum 8, Page 30, Line 17-22; Addendum 10, Page 14, Line 9-14 and Page 22, Lines 6-8; and 
Addendum 12) 
12. The trial court issued an order entitled "Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution 
Granting Homestead Exemption" on December 4, 2003. The trial court set forth its ruling in the 
Findings and Legal Conclusions. Paragraph 13 of the Legal Conclusions states as follows: 
"The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001 is defeated 
by the filing of a homestead declaration on March 26, 2003. " (See Addendum 11, 
Paragraph 13.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The cross-appellants take exception to the legal "correctness" of the trial court's Order on 
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead Exemption at Paragraph 13; and as such, have 
appealed the court's decision granting a homestead exemption after the judicial lien (prejudgment 
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Writ of Attachment of March 26,2001) was ordered by the trial court. The cross-appellants further 
contend that the old house at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was not devoted to homestead use, 
and therefore was non-exempt property at the time the judicial lien of March 26,2001 attached, and 
that the subsequent change of status (Mrs. Miller doing repairs and moving in) cannot be used to 
defeat an existing judicial lien at a time the property had no exempt status under the Utah 
Exemptions Act. 
ARGUMENT 1 
WHETHER THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH 
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH QUALIFIED FOR HOMESTEAD 
EXEMPTION ON MARCH 26,2001 WHEN A JUDICIAL LIEN 
SEIZED THE PROPERTY. 
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25 AND PAGE 20, LINES 1-18.) 
The cross-appellants were in the process of suing the cross-appellee for fraud. (See 
Addendum 8, Page 19, Line 25 and Page 20, Lines 1-18.) On March 26,2001, the cross-appellants 
petitioned the trial court, pursuant to Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a 
prejudgment Writ of Attachment to seize certain real property owned by the cross-appellee, namely 
an old uninhabited house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. After a hearing, the 
prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered. (See Addendum 2). The Order and the Writ of 
Attachment were prepared and signed by the judge on April 17,2001, and recorded in the Tooele 
County Recorder's Office on June 15,2001. (See Addendums 3 and 4.) 
At the time the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered by the trial court seizing 358 
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North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, the cross-appellee's primary personal residence was 891 Upland 
Drive, Tooele, Utah. He personally lived there with his wife and family and had done so for several 
years. (See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6 and 7.) 
The Utah Exemption Act, as set forth in Section 78-23-4 et al, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, sets forth the right to claim a homestead exemption, but only after complying with the 
statutory mandates. 
The old uninhabited house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was not cross-
appellee's personal primary residence on March 26, 2001, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii), 
which states as follows: (See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 10.) 
"78-23-3(2)(a)(ii): 
"An individual is entitled to "a " homestead exemption consisting of property 
in this state in an amount not exceeding: 
"(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal 
residence of the individual " 
"78-23-3 (2)(b)(ii): 
"(ii) for property exempt under Subsection (2) (a) (ii), the 
maximum exemption may not exceed $40,000 per household. " 
Primary personal residence is defined for homestead exemption purposes at Section 78-23-
3(l)(a) as: 
"Primary personal residence means a dwelling or mobile home land the land 
surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as in reasonable necessary for the use of the 
dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual1 s household 
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reside;..." 
Residence has been defined for qualifying for a homestead exemption as follows: 
"Residence means living or dwelling in a certain place permanently or for 
a considerable length of time. It is the place where a man makes his home, or where 
he dwells permanently, or for an extended period of time." Bonebrake v. Morrow, 
190 SE Reporter 506 (1937) 
"Household" is defined for qualifying for a homestead exemption pursuant to Section 
78-23-3(l)(a) as follows: 
"Household means a group of persons related by blood or marriage living 
together in the same dwelling as an economic unit, sharing furnishings, facilities, 
accommodations and expenses." 
On March 26,2001, the old uninhabited house at 358 North 100 East in Tooele, Utah was 
not cross-appellee's "primary personal residence," was not cross-appellee's "residence," and was not 
cross-appellee's "household," pursuant to Section 78-23-3 of the Utah Code. Furthermore, it 
provided no income or shelter to anyone. (See Addendum 11, and Addendum 8, Page 25, Lines 6-
11.) Therefore, it is legally impossible for cross-appellee to claim 358 North 100 East as his 
"homestead." As a matter of law, on March 26, 2001, when the Writ of Attachment was ordered 
against 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, the only property cross-appellee could claim as his 
homestead was where he and his family were then living, which as 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. 
(See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6 and 7.) Therefore, the protections or exemptions set forth in 
Section 78-23-3(3)(a)(b)(c) and (d) do not apply because they only apply in instances where the 
specific property qualifies as a "homestead." 
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ARGUMENT 2 
WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD FILED 
ON MARCH 27,2003 NULLIFIED THE JUDICIAL LIEN ORDERED 
AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH 
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH ON MARCH 26,2001. 
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25; PAGE 20, LINES 1-20; 
PAGE 22, LINES 8-13) 
In December of 2002, the primary personal residence at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, 
where the cross-appellee's family was living, was foreclosed upon. The family then moved to 
another unknown location. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 9.) 
In the early part of 2003, almost two years after the Writ of Attachment was ordered by the 
court, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, 
in preparation of moving in. (See Addendum 8, Page 22, Lines 7-13 and Addendum 11, "Findings" 
at Paragraphs 6 through 10.) On March 27,2003, Mrs. Miller recorded a Declaration of Homestead 
in the Tooele County Recorder's Office. (See Addendum 5.) 
On April 10, 2003, the trial court entered judgment against cross-appellee for committing 
fraud in the amount of $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6.) On May 1,2003, a Writ of Execution was 
issued by the trial court, in conjunction with the prejudgment Writ of Attachment granted on March 
26,2001. (See Addendum 7.) 
The issue now becomes whether the cross-appellee can claim a homestead exemption in the 
real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah in March of 2003, when he could not make 
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the same claim in March of 2001. It is the cross-appellant's contention that no homestead exemption 
can be claimed in March of 2003 that will defeat the judicial lien ordered against the property in 
March of 2001. 
The trial court's ruling relies solely on Sanders v. Cassidv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978). (See 
Addendum 9.) But the issue in Sanders is different than the issue in the case at bar. 
Even the Sanders case distinguishes its ruling from this fundamental difference in Footnote 
4 at Page 426, which states as follows: 
"In the case before us, Dunham was qualified a head of the household and 
was entitled to the exemption before the judgment lien was recorded. 
"Furthermore, the language referred to above was taken from Evans v. 
Jensen, a case where the owner was not entitled to a homestead exemption at the 
time the lien attached. " 
In this appeal, the homestead exemption did not previously exist before the Writ of 
Attachment seized the property on March 26, 2001, and cannot be later created to defeat the prior 
judicial lien. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has ruled in Evans v. Jensen. 51 Utah 1; 168 P. 762 (Utah 
1917), the following: 
"Existing liens on property cannot be defeated by subsequently claiming said 
property as a homestead" 
"In Crosby v. Anderson. 49 Utah 167,162 P. 75, it is expressly held that non-
exempt property may be converted into property which will be exempt, but the 
conversion must be made at some time before not after a lien has attached. That 
principle is especially applicable to homestead exemptions by the great weight of 
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authority. Nor, in our judgment, is there anything to the contrary in any of the cases 
decided by this court. " 
"The rule has been applied in cases of liens created by judgment, liens 
created by levy of execution, liens created by attachment mechanics' liens and 
materialmen's liens. " 40 C. J. S. 54 
Counsel can find no exception to this rule. 
Waples on Homestead and Exemption (1893), Pages 302-303, sets forth this law more 
precisely as follows: 
"Attachment Liens. 
"(1) Claiming homestead after attachment: When the law 
gives the right of attachment for debt, it gives also that of sale, to 
complete the object: the satisfaction of the debt. Such right is, from 
the time the lien attaches by seizure a vested right and property. In 
this respect, there is no difference between a lien secured by a levy of 
an attachment and one secured by the docketing of a Judgment, or the 
levy of an execution,. . .This was said in deciding that an owner 
cannot defeat an attachment lien by selecting the attached property 
as his homestead after the seizure... 
"Whether the debtor would be permitted to claim homestead 
in realty specifically burdened by an attachment lien, when the 
creditor has a vested right of lien on the particular property claimed, 
is a different question; and a question that has been fully answered 
by the decisions next cited. The answer is negative. .. 
"When property, not exempt from execution, has been 
attached, no subsequent action of the owner, such as claiming it as 
a homestead, moving upon it making it the family home and 
complying generally with the legal requisites for establishing a 
homestead, will defeat the attachment lien. When the preliminary 
seizure has been effected legally, it precludes homestead dedication 
as effectually as levy after judgment could do so. " 
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CONCLUSION 
The cross-appellants seek to have the Utah Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's 
determination that the cross-appellee has a right to claim a homestead exemption on the real property 
located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. It is undisputed that the personal primary residence of 
the cross-appellee on March 26,2001 was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, not the old uninhabitable 
house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, which offers no shelter or income to anyone. 
The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, ordered by the trial court on March 26,2001, seized 
the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, at a time when the real property was 
not "impressed" with a homestead and "...no subsequent action of the owner (cross-appellee), such 
as claiming it as a homestead, moving upon it, making it the family home and complying generally 
with the legal requisites for establishing a homestead, will defeat the attachment lien." Wapleson 
Homestead and Exemptions (1893), Page 303. 
WHEREFORE, the cross-appellee is not entitled, as a matter of law, to a homestead 
exemption as to the real property located at 3 5 8 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah; and therefore, the trial 
court's decision should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of November, 2004. 
DOUGLAS/F. WHITE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 19 day of November, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a 
two accurate copies of the foregoing Cross-Appellants' Brief to: 
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042 
Cross-Appellee 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
p. Nj^Ufel^ 4.M-
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR - * 20M 
In the Third District Court of Tooele County-
State of Utah 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
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Date Filed Document Page Number 
02/21/03 Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion 391 - 392 
02/27/03 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's 393 - 395 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 
02/28/03 Notice to Submit for Decision 396 - 397 
03/24/03 Minute Entry Decision 398 - 399 
04/18/03 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 400 - 404 
04/18/03 Judgment 405 - 407 
04/28/03 Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel 408 - 409 
06/12/03 Request for Hearing, Notification of 410 
06/17/03 Return on Writ of Execution 411 - 416 
06/26/03 Notice of Hearing on Writ of Execution 417 - 418 
07/18/03 Summary Motion to Stay Writ of Execution 419 
07/22/03 Order for Stay of Execution 420 
07/22/03 Request for Transportation to Attend Hrg 421 
07/23/03 Transportation Order to Attend Scheduled Hrg 422 
07/25/03 Motion to Set Aside Judgment 423 - 432 
07/28/03 Affidavit of Defendant Glen E. Miller 433 - 436 
08/04/03 Minutes - Oral Argument 437 
08/07/03 Order Granting Homestead Exemption 43 8 - 441 
08/08/03 Memorandum for Record 442 - 443 
08/18/03 Request for Video 444 
08/29/03 Memorandum for Record 445 - 454 
09/02/03 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 455 - 456 
Written Objections to Proposed Order on 
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment 
09/02/03 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 457 - 458 
Written Objections to Proposed Order on 
Motion to Determine Homestead Exemption 
09/02/03 Letter from Glen Miller 459 
09/04/03 Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of 460 
Time 
09/04/03 Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of 461 
Time 
09/16/03 Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff's Sale 462 - 463 
09/17/03 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 464 - 465 
Written Objections 
09/18/03 Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt 466 - 468 
of Court 
09/19/03 Letter from Atty Angerhofer to Inmate 469 
Placement Program 
09/19/03 Letter to the Judge from Glen E. Miller 470 
09/19/03 Objections to Proposed Order on Motion to 471 - 475 
Determine Homestead Exemption 
09/24/03 Notice of Judgment Recorded in the 476 - 477 
Registry of Judgments 
10/02/03 Objections to Plaintiffs' Order on 478 - 479 
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting 
Homestead Exemption and Defendant's 
Proposed order 
10/03/03 Letter to the Judge from Atty White 480 
Houghtons & Thomases V. Miller Case #000301127 Page 4 
Date Filed Document Page Number 
10/03/03 Notice to Submit for Decision and/or 481 - 482 
Request for Oral Argument 
10/07/03 Objections to Order to Set Aside Summary 483 
Judgment 
10/07/03 Notice to Submit for Decision and Judicial 484 - 493 
Notice 
10/09/03 Request for Judicial Notice of Homestead 494 - 495 
10/14/03 Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order 496 - 497 
on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead 
Exemption 
10/14/03 Request for Oral Argument 498 - 499 
10/27/03 Notice of Oral Argument 500 - 502 
11/17/03 Verified Affidavit of Glen E. Miller 503 - 506 
11/19/03 Order of Transportation 507 
12/03/03 Notice of Appearance of Counsel 508 - 509 
12/04/03 Minutes - Oral Argument 510 
12/04/03 Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution 511 - 516 
Granting Homestead Exemption 
12/05/03 Copy of Writ of Execution 517 - 520 
12/11/03 Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal 521 - 524 
12/12/03 Notice of Appeal and Request for Waiver 525 - 527 
of Fees 
12/15/03 Ruling and Order 528 - 531 
12/18/03 Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 532 - 533 
12/23/03 Letter from Glen E. Miller Requesting a 534 - 536 
Transcript 
12/29/03 Request for Hearing - Notification of 537 
Exemption 
02/30/03 Notice of Cross-Appeal 538 - 539 
01/06/04 Return of Service on Writ of Execution 540 - 543 
01/08/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 544 
01/13/04 Minute Entry 545 - 549 
01/13/04 Minute Entry 550 - 551 
01/16/04 Request for Transcripts 552 - 553 
01/22/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 554 
02/17/04 Petition for Rule 65B Extraordinary Relief 555 - 574 
02/24/04 Proof of Publication of Notice of Sheriff's 575 
Sale of Real Property 
02/27/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 576 
03/01/04 Order - Utah Court of Appeals 577 
TRANSCRIPTS 
01/30/04 Hearing Held December 4, 2003 578 
01/30/04 Hearing Held August 4, 2003 579 
Addendum 2 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801)296-1754 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 ) 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
GLEN E.MILLER, ] 
Defendants. 
) ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
1 PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
) ATTACHMENT 
• Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge David S. Young 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the 
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but 
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following Order: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following 
described parcels of real property is hereby granted: 
1 
. n n n i FILED 
J h 0
 ClbfRICT COURT TOOELE 
01 APR (7 AH 10; 1*8 
FILED B Y . 
Parcel No. 1- All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. 
Serial No 10-8-C-l 
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.9$ feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet, thence South 43.5 
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer of 
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of 
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and 
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No. 2-42-14 
2. The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the 
above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest 
to another in anyway. 
3. A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear 
before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time 
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of 
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances. 
DATED this /C day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S YOUNG I 
Third Distrfct Court Aidgi 
2 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY 
TO: Gregory P. Hawkins 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form o_f the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this 
^ r day of March, 2001, to the following person(s): 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84115 
Legal Assistant 
1
 CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
r-=S!G!NAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
• 'STRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY, STATE 
"UTAH ^ , , 
:ATE : / ' _ _ _ 
DEPUTtfCOURT C£BfiK 
3 
Addendum 3 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801)296-1754 
WTH.N NAMED DEFEND,-.i AT j==*T-r^. g jte. 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH 
BY DEPUTY y( > ) c 5 ^ ^ - < ~ - ^ 
THIS &*. • DAY OF , . „ _ * t ^ j Q p t , 
. FRANK A SCHARMANN 
Sheriff, Tooele, Utah 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendants. 
WRTT OF ATTACHMENT 
Civil No. 000301127 
Judge David S. Young 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, the above-entitled Court, on the 26th day of March, 2001, granted the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment; and as such, any and all interest, right and title of Glen 
E. Miller in the below described real property is hereby attached. 
WHEREAS, the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, is hereby directed to attach and 
keep safe all of the real property set forth below until further order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 
64(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Said real property hereby attached is described as follows 
ParcelNo 1 All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City Serial No 10-8-C-l 
ParcelNo 2 Beginningl37feetWestoftheSoutheastcornerofLot5,Block4l,Pla1 "A", Tooele 
City Survey, running thence West 196 96 feet, thence North 43 5 feet, thence East 
196 96 feet, thence South 43 5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No 2-57-27 
Parcel No 3 Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer ofBlock 26, Plat 
"A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of beginning being the Southwest 
comer of the Hawker property, and running thence East 504 feet, thence South 248 
feet, thence West 9 feet, thence North 1815 feet, thence West 495 feet, thence North 
66 5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No 2-42-14 
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this tf day of April, A D 2001. 
Ijt&foS $£k "HT-As1-
CLERK 
V 
-
 r
»u = , THAT ") H C IS M T P U . COPY C f / 
C I'PLDOCO'lENTONFiLCINTHETHiRD 
^TI ICT COURT TOOELE COUNTY STATU 
,,;T,H /-7-«y 
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Addendum 4 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (80n 296-1754 
IN THE THIRD 
JBD DISTRICT COURT TOOELE 
FILED B v A 
E 1 & 4 9 0 6 B 0 6 8 7 P O O 
Date 15-JUN-2001 IE:00pm 
Fee: 18.00 Cash 
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder 
OlSTK^feS&GTftS F 
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF T 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY 
vs. 
GLENF Mil 1 i'K 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT 
Civil No, 000301127 
Judge David S. Young 
The Plaintiffs' Mot^ judgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the 
lay of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. * 5 Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their -itloi itc v. I h miilx, I* White; the Defendant was not personally present, but 
- - ^presented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having rev iewed the pleadings and 
the evidence by proffer of tin »H..nu.j\s, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following Order: 
1 »e Plaintiffs' Molt »^ 1 ,, irejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following 
described parcels of real property is hereby granted: 
E 1 & 4 9 0 6 B O G 8 7 P O O P . e 
Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. 
Serial No. 10-8-C-l 
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner of 
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of 
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and 
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14 
2. The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the 
above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest 
to another in anyway. 
3. A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear 
before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time 
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of 
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances. 
DATED this 
A day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. YdUNGJ 
Third Distrfct Court Jtidgi 
2 
E I G 4 9 0 6 B 0 6 8 7 P O O E 3 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: Gregory P. Hawkins 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufiBcient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this 
^^T day of March, 2001, to the following person(s): 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84115 
I CERTIFY THAI THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH s\ A 
HATP- A^MH Ity^/)m 
DEPUTY COURT C L S I R 
xilzh £u 
JUDWETE^SON 
Legal Assistant 
3 
Addendum 5 
Declaration of Homestead 
1. I, Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, claimant, a married woman hereby declare that I am 
entitled to a homestead exemption under Utah Constitution, Article XXII Section 
2. Claimant further states that her spouse has not filed a declaration of homestead. 
3. The homestead claimed as exempt in this Declaration of Homestead is located 
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, Utah and is more fully described 
to wit: 
Beginning 303 feet, more or less, south of the Northwest corner of block 26, 
V Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; Tooele City, said point of beginning being the 
> Southwest corner of the Hawker Property; and running thence East 504; 
V thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence 
^ West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
4. The estimated cash value of this real property is $85,000. 
5. The amount of the homestead claimed is $120,000 as computed as follows: 
Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, 47, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Glen Eugene Miller, 48, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Thomas Samuel Miller, 21, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Angela Miller, 18, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Kimberly Miller, 16, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Elizabeth Miller, 14, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
g^^O^^MpA 
r'sracT COURT, TOOELE C O U N W S ^ . - . ^ X ,y ^ Signature of Claimant 
CFUTAH. - , / • f? ; fe? *'<- N • {\ 
„ ii- / - 7 - ^ y n ~£-V< j • •' £ 1 9 8 & 2 5 B 8 3 4 P 
OAi fc-^i . , ^  U ;
 rp , • D a t e E7-HAR-2003 1:14pm 
—^JQcZ&A&AT%:-- " ' Fee:' "10.08 Cash 
^PUTYCOUMTCLERKW . . ^ . ^ _ . CftLLEEN PESHELL, Recorder 
VV, % r • »' - Filed By CBP 
\ , Oi^-CA^ // For LORI MILLER 
STATE OF T J T A H % j ^ ) f o - 5 i t ' ^ ' TODELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me, ^ A , , M , ? ^ ^SrfiFy.nr^ 
a Notary Public for the State of Utah, this cg^day of Mf\dCi4 2003. 
My commission expires /p
 { Ofn^Af.Z ^^ v-^ . 
Addendum 6 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 : 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. 
GLEN E.MILLER, 
Defendants. 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
COMES NOW, the Court and having considered the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant's response to it, and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and good 
cause appearing therefore; the Court now hereby enters the following order and JUDGMENT as 
follows: 
1. There is no genuine issue of material facts in dispute; and therefore, the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a judgment against the Defendant as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
1 
* - - £ D DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 8 2003 
^ T O O E L E COUNTY 
y £_ 
Deputy Clerk ~" 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
3. Jerry Houghton and Susan Houghton are granted a judgment, jointly and severally, 
against the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, in the amount of $88,129.00 as of November 30, 2002. Post 
judgment interest to accrue at the contract rates. 
4. Kendall R. Thomas, Marlene Thomas and the 199 5 Thomas Family Trust are granted 
a judgment, jointly and severally, against the Defendant, Glen E.. Miller. Post judgment interest to 
accrue at the contract rates. V u ^ ^ ^ i 4 < n , W , % * < p ^ -
DATED this J p ^ day of April, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
RANDALUSKANCHT 
Judge 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: LONN LITCHFIELD 
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
mailed to • 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
• you to allow you sufficienttii^tcrf}lejany^tten objections to the form of the foregoing 
| ^ V - ^ ^ I J D3 iHr COURT TOOE-.E COUNTY S.Alu 
cufaK 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on 
this 3rd day of April, 2003, to the following person(s): 
Lonn Litchfield 
ATKIN & HAWKINS 
Attorney at Law 
136 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATL\ 
JUD^ETER§ON, Legal Assistant 
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Addendum 7 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84016 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Civil No. 000301127 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered in this action by the above Court in £ 
the 10th day of April, 2003, against said Defendant, Glen E. Miller, and in favor of said Plaintiffs, 
in the amount of: 
Judgment amount 
Estimated costs of this Writ 
TOTAL 
$271,398.00 
$ 65.00 
sc^2?l,46 
Retcrtk>nsh-! 
Time 
Address DeputY 
with interest pursuant to judgment contract rates, from the date of judgment until paid, plus after-
accruing costs. 
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaicfjudgment, with 
costs, interest, and fees, and to sell enough of the Defendant's real or personal property to satisfy the 
same. This shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing. Within sixty (60) days after your receipt 
of this Writ, return this Writ with a statement and certificate of your doings in completing the 
service. WHEREOF FAIL NOT. 
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this / day of A p ^ A . D . 2003. 
2 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE TOOELE VALLEY JUSTICE'S COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ] 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ] 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, } 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
GLEN E. MILLER, ] 
Defendant. 
1 P R A E C I P E 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
TO THE SHERIFF OF TOOELE COUNTY: 
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution herewith handed you, you are required to levy on and sell 
the following property belonging to the judgment debtor, Glen E. Miller. Said properties are located 
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah and lot behind 288 North Main (see 
plat map), Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah, respectively; and further described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: Beginning 303 feet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; 
thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 
feet to point of beginning, combining T-504 and T-504-1. Containing 0.77 acres. 
Parcel No. 02-42-14. 
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5, Block 
41, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence West 196.96 feet; thence'North 
43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 435. feet to the point of beginning 
out of 2-57-17. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27. 
DATED this _Jo_ day of April, 2003. 
v~L * uxJP 
D^UGIAS F. WHITE 
Attorned for Plaintiffs 
2 
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Addendum 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 000301127 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
August 4, 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE 
3282 South Sunset Hollow Dr 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435)843-9399 
GLEN E. MILLER 
(Appearing pro se) 
(Address not provided) 
(Phone number not provided) 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
-2-
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 4, 2003) 
3 THE COURT: This is the matter of Jerry Houghton versus 
4 Glen Miller. It's case 000301127. Mr. Miller's motion to set 
5 aside the writ of — set aside the judgment. So that's where 
6 we're at. Go ahead. 
7 MR. MILLER: Ycur Honor, could I have a pen — a hand 
8 released so that I might be able to use a pen so that I could 
9 take notes? 
10 THE COURT: I'll only do that if my security officers 
11 indicate that's acceptable. 
12 MR. MILLER: Also, this is a hearing on the writ of 
13 execution, or is this a hearing on the motion for dismissal? 
14 THE COURT: It's a hearing on both. 
15 MR. MILLER: Okay. So we'll be discussing both at this 
16 time? 
17 THE COURT: I think so. 
18 MR. MILLER: Because — okay. Because I was not told 
19 that we would be having the hearing on both, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Well, you've come a long way and it would 
21 be nice to have you be able to have everything handled today. 
22 MR. MILLER: Okay. Whatever we — before I — we 
23 discuss the writ of execution, your Honor, may I ask some 
24 questions pertaining to the judgment itself? 
25 THE COURT: No, no. I just want you to present your 
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argument. You know, I've got a busy calendar here. We've got 
a lot of people that need to be heard. 
MR. MILLER: Well, this — 
THE COURT; I need to hear your argument on this 
particular issue so we can go forward. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. I have outlined in the motion to 
dismiss the issues involved. I was never even aware that there 
was a judgment at all in this case. I had not received any 
notice until I received the writ of execution on the 6th of 
June, and so under the summary judgment I had not even been 
notified that there was a judgment, that I could respond to the 
judgment or that matter. 
Also, in the writ of execution there gave an amount 
of the judgment of $271,000 that was granted to the plaintiffs. 
I was wondering where that figure came from in this particular 
case. 
THE COURT: You know, the way things work here, you 
make an argument and I listen to it. 
hear 
want 
like 
MR. MILLER 
THE COURT: 
your argument. 
to say that is 
that — 
MR. MILLER: 
THE COURT: 
Okay. 
I am not here to be questioned. I simply 
What you may say, then, is the way you'd 
"and I think that's in error/' or something 
Okay. 
— as opposed to posing some question to me 
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1 about it (inaudible). 
2 MR. MILLER: Okay, your Honor, this is the first time 
3 I've ever done this, so — 
4 THE COURT: Well, you've done a very nice job in terms 
5 of what you've provided the Court. It's been very beneficial 
6 and useful. So you're doing great so far. Just — 
7 MR. MILLER: Okay, thank you, your Honor. Yes, and I'm 
8 scared, too, and it's just — 
9 THE COURT: No reason to be scared. 
10 MR. MILLER: Okay. Also, the reason I bring that 
11 point up is that the plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit in 
12 November of 1999, but in January or February of 2000 they 
13 received a judgment on the promissory notes, and that was 
14 already issued in, like I say, in January or February of the 
15 year 2000. 
16 This particular lawsuit, as I understand it, as 
17 I don't have all the paperwork pertaining to it, is a 
18 supplementary one. It's one filed after that against me 
19 personally for fraud, and so that one — and now if this 
20 judgment in this second lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against 
21 me is for the amount of the promissory note that has already 
22 been resolved under the first lawsuit that was — they were 
23 awarded a judgment of in 2000 against LD&B Corporation. 
24 So according to — under the rules of the res judicata 
25 this shouldn't be able to be tried again. So that is a reason 
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1 for — another reason not mentioned in my motion as to why this 
2 judgment should be set aside. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. White, does your client have a judgment 
4 against Mr. Miller that precedes this one on these same — 
5 MR. WHITE: No. 
6 THE COURT: — issues? All right. 
7 MR. WHITE: It is against a company called LD&B. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. WHITE: Totally separate. 
10 THE COURT: What I'd indicate to you, Mr. Miller, is 
11 that parties may sue people in their individual and in their 
12 corporate capacities, and maybe that's what occurred. A 
13 judgment has been taken against your corporation or whatever 
14 it was, and I'm not privy to that, so I don't know. 
15 MR. MILLER: Uh-huh. 
16 THE COURT: And B, subsequently a judgment was taken 
17 against you personally. Maybe in this case based upon — 
18 based upon the allegations of self dealing or not maintaining 
19 a corporation, that you might be subject to these particular 
20 judgments, but regardless of that, the judgment's been entered. 
21 So now we understand that they're not — they're not two 
22 judgments taken against you. So res judicata is not going to 
23 apply. 
24 MR. MILLER: But the promissory notes are exactly the 
25 same. 
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MR. MILLER: I was sued in that first one, and the 
judgment was issued, though, against LD&B Management. 
THE COURT: All right. I understand your argument 
there. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. Now, I'd like to right now, your 
Honor, address the homestead issue that I filed — 
THE COURT: Address the service issue for me, please. 
That's the most important one. 
MR. MILLER: The service issue? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. The only service which I received 
was the writ of execution. There was no other service that I 
received. I was not informed of any judgment. I was not 
informed of any lawsuit that was pending against me in these 
proceedings. I had written my attorney on February 13th and 
asked if there had — was anything that was going on. 
THE COURT: Now, your attorney unfortunately withdrew, 
and so this is where you end up. 
THE COURT: And he withdrew, as I understood, in April 
-7 
1 or — but he never sent me any notification of withdrawal. 
2 THE COURT: Withdrew. He withdrew on the 25tr of April 
3 2003, although I note that no order was entered by a Judge, 
4 meaning he hadn't officially withdrawn. 
5 MR. MILLER: Yeah, Mr. White informed me today that 
6 he had withdrawn. That was the first I had heard. I had 
7 written — 
8 THE COURT: Well, he believes he's withdrawn, but until 
9 an order is executed by the Judge, he hasn't. 
10 MR. MILLER: And so I have not — I had not received 
11 anything pertaining to the issues of the case, being able 
12 to argue against the summary judgment, motion for summary 
13 judgment. I've outlined in my motion other elements pertaining 
14 m the — to have it dismissed as to why it should be dismissed 
15 because I was never informed of the judgment and I was never 
16 able to provide a defense. 
17 THE COURT: Well, let me indicate something for you 
18 so you fully understand it. You were served with the initial 
19 summons in this case. That is, you were served because you had 
20 retained Counsel, and Counsel was representing you. Indeed 
21 while Counsel was representing you, this motion for summary 
22 judgment was filed. Your Counsel actually filed a response m 
23 opposition to that motion for summary judgment, and this matter 
24 was heard before your Counsel chose LO withdraw. 
25 So whether your Counsel was informing you of what's 
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1 going on, that may or may not have happened, but you had 
2 representation, whatever it was, through this lawyer, whomever 
3 he was that you retained, but he was representing you through 
4 — up through and including the time this judgment was entered. 
5 So service on your lawyer is service on you. 
6 MR. MILLER: Okay. There — 
7 THE COURT: Go to the homestead issue. 
8 MR. MILLER: Okay. Yes, your Honor. Okay. As you're 
9 aware, your Honor, the homestead is a Constitutional creation, 
10 and as such it's not just a privilege, but an absolute right. 
11 It's intended to secure and protect the home against creditors 
12 as a means of support to every family, and that's found in 
13 Kimball versus Salisbury case. 
14 Black's Law Dictionary defines a Constitutional 
15 homestead as a homestead along with its exemption from forced 
16 sale conferred upon the head of a household by a State 
17 Constitution. Article 22, Section 1 of the Utah State 
18 Constitution outlines that a homestead law needs to be passed. 
19 So therefore the homestead law itself is found in code Section 
20 78-23-3. 
21 Now, the term "homestead" is not defined itself m the 
22 code section. However, according to the terms of statutory 
23 construction — you know, we turn to a dictionary, and again in 
24 Webster's and also in Black's Dictionary — Law Dictionary — 
25 homestead is defined as the home, the appurtenances, the out-
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1 buildings and the land surrounding the primary residence of a 
2 family, a person or his family. 
3 The property located at 358 North 100 East is the 
4 principal residence of my family. The homestead was recorded 
5 in Tooele County Recorder's Office on March 27th, 2003. Now, 
6 I do not have a copy of that. If my wife is present in the 
7 courtroom, she would have a copy of that if you want to view 
8 that as an official document, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Let's just for this argument assume that it 
10 exists. 
11 MR. MILLER: Okay. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
12 the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed m favor 
13 of the debtor to protect him and his family from hardship, and 
14 that was stated m Russell M. Miller Company versus Given. 
15 Also, m the Court case Folson versus Asper they 
16 stated that because homestead is a Constitutional creation, 
17 all laws thereto must be liberally construed to protect it 
18 and make it effective for the dependent and the help — the 
19 dependent and helpless to insure them shelter and support. 
20 Again, m Pentagopolis versus Manning, they said 
21 that the law should be broadly construed to accomplish its 
22 beneficent purpose. 
23 In the case of McMurdie versus Chugg, one of the 
24 beneficent purposes to the homestead was given when it said 
25 that the law was to protect the land which was designated 
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1 homestead against forced sale for an ordinary judgment lien. 
2 Subsection 3 of the law of Section 78-23-3 clearly 
3 states, "A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from 
4 levy, execution or forced sale." Applying the definition found 
5 m the dictionary about the homestead, it said it would be the 
6 house, out-buildings and adjoining land owned and occupied by a 
7 person or family as a primary residence is exempt from judicial 
8 lien and from levy, execution and forced sale. 
9 There are four exemptions that are given to which 
10 a homestead could be levied. One is a statutory lien for 
11 property taxes and assessments on the property. Plaintiffs 
12 judgment is not for those. 
13 A security interest m the property and judicial liens 
14 for debts created for the purchase price of the property. 
15 Again, the plaintiff's judgment is not for that purpose. 
16 Three, judicial liens, which is what theirs is, 
17 obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or 
18 maintenance for dependent children. Theirs is not a judicial 
19 lien for the support of dependent children, or maintenance. 
20 Four, consensual liens obtained on debts created by 
21 mutual contract, and there's nothing consensual about the 
22 plaintiff s lien on the property, so that exemption does nor 
23 apply there. So none of the exemptions as stated m the law 
24 cover that — the plaintiffs judgment. 
25 Now, up to this point I've only talked about the 
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1 beneficent purpose which is to provide security and protecting 
2 a family's home against the creditors, but there's another 
3 element of the law, and that is that of the homestead amount. 
4 While the Courts have ruled that the homestead is 
5 protected, they have also stated that a homestead cannot be 
6 used to defeat a lien that's already on the property. Okay, 
7 and there is a Court case — and that was in McMurdie versus 
8 Chugg. 
9 Now, there is also a case where the Utah Supreme 
10 Court allowed the a sale of the homestead, but still granted 
11 the exemption amount, which — okay, which tends to make the 
12 homestead appear that it is an amount, not the homestead. That 
13 was in the Court case of Gilroy versus Lowe, but the facts of 
14 that case are totally different. 
15 In that case a judgment was awarded against the Lowes, 
16 and then eight years l=>ter, upon the execution of that judgment 
17 and after an order had been issued by the Court to force sale 
18 the property, then they filed the homestead claiming that it 
19 was exempt, and a judgment which was eight years later — 
20 again, after the judgment they filed the homestead simply as 
21 a means to defeating that judgment and to preserving their 
22 home, but they were still granted the homestead amount: because 
23 of the homestead law. 
24 THE COURT: And how do you balance this homestead 
25 amount, which is a smail amount — $20,000 m the case of the 
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1 primary residence — against the rest of what might otherwise 
2 be subject to execution? That is, the home itself. 
3 MR. MILLER: That is a very valid point, your Honor, 
4 and I would like to emphasize that point in this — at this 
5 time, because the Tenth Circuit Court around 1994 in the case 
6 David Dorsey Distributing versus Sanders stated that a judgment 
7 lien never attaches to the homestead. It never attaches to the 
8 homestead under Utah law. 
9 Now, there's another case called Gisey Walker Company 
10 versus Biggs where again they talk about where the exemption 
11 amount is lower than the value of the property and say that it 
12 could be sold at a forced sale. However, it referred to the 
13 law at that time which was m force, which specifically stated 
14 that a homestead could be levied in excess. That wording has 
15 been dropped from the present statute that there no longer can 
16 be that. 
17 Now, the Courts have had to weigh the differences to 
18 what is the beneficent purpose of the homestead and what is an 
19 actual use of the homestead in protecting a family and a home 
20 and the people, and in the particular cases where they have 
21 allowed for the execution of the homestead, in each of those 
22 cases the homestead was filed after the judgment, and it was 
23 filed after the writ of execution had been given, and it was 
24 only used as a means to defeat that execution. 
25 However, m other Court cases such as — as I 
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That 
couldn' 
he 
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assert the lien against an existing homestead. 
It was later ruled that the right to claim a homestead 
exemption is a right that the head of family may assert to 
prevent sale under execution of his homestead at any time 
before sale of the premises, unless the claim against such 
property has been previously asserted and actually adjudicated 
against him. That was found in Utah Builder's Supply Company 
versus Gardner. So what they have — the Court has ruled that 
they can assert that any time prior to the sale as long as it 
hasn't been adjudicated. 
Now, as I stated, m all of the cases where the 
homestead was executed — and they use it m bankruptcy, as I 
understand, a lot. I'm not familiar with that, but they have 
used that, and the Court of Appeals has also said that it's not 
fair for a person to continue living in their home and enjoy 
that living, and then declare bankruptcy while all of those 
other creditors have been left to hang dry out in the wind, and 
defraud them of that money. 
Now, finally, the Utah Supreme Court ruled m Payson 
Exchange Savings Bank versus Teachen that the levy of execution 
upon a homestead is not voidable, but it's absolutely void. 
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1 Now, in our case the homestead was prepared and filed prior to 
2 any judgment and without any attempt on our part or the part of 
3 my wife to defeat any existing lien. 
4 THE COURT: When did you say the date of that filing 
5 was? 
6 MR. MILLER: The date of the filing was the 26th day 
7 of March 2003. That was the date that she filed — or 27th day 
8 of March. She signed it on the 26tn She would have done it 
9 sooner, but the property was in such bad condition from renters 
10 having been m there and left it unsecured and such, that she 
11 spent about four, five months trying to prepare the house to 
12 make it just habitable. So as soon as it was habitable and 
13 she could move m , she filed the declaration of homestead. Not 
14 in an attempt to defeat any judgment. Not in an attempt to 
15 escape any creditors, but as a protection so that she might 
16 have a place to live. 
17 We had a house previously. A fire burned it. It was 
18 then foreclosed upon, as the insurance company or the bank 
19 refused to allow the money to fix the house to be released. I 
20 don't know all of the details and the particulars because I was 
21 m prison at the time that that occurred, but we did lose that. 
22 So after that time, we looked and this house was available 
23 for her to move into, and she prepared it to move into. Now, 
24 again, as I said, it was not — it was to provide stability to 
25 her, to provide stability for the family, and to proviae for 
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1 her. 
2 Then another event has just recently occurred m this 
3 Court, your Honor, where this past Thursday I received a copy 
4 of an order of separate maintenance from this Court which was 
5 for my wife Lori, and it granted to her the use of the property 
6 located at 358 North 100 East as an award of alimony for her, 
7 and m reviewing the exemption statute, as well as Rule 69 of 
8 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, property that is necessary 
9 for support, such as alimony — and that is found in 78-23-6 — 
10 child support, et cetera is exempt from execution. This home 
11 was given to her by the Court as alimony for her to live in. 
12 Again, another reason not just for the homestead, but for the 
13 alimony as well. Therefore, this also creates an exemption 
14 from levy of the property located there at 358 North Main. 
15 Now, there is a second piece of property listed in 
16 the (inaudible) that was a smaller, little lot that is located 
17 at about 280 South Main Street here m Tooele. This is not 
18 a primary residence, so therefore the execution amount of 
19 homestead, as we had talked earlier, would apply to this, and 
20 under the statute it can have a maximum execution — or not a 
21 maximum execution, but a statutory exemption of $10,000 per 
22 household. 
23 As stated in my request for the hearing, the rax 
24 appraisal that I had last seen on it was for $4,000. So that 
25 the value of that piece of property is sufficiently low that 
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1 it would also exempt it from levy. If the Court deems that it 
2 should be levied under this case and then the homestead granted 
3 based under the exemption amount for that, then, you know, I 
4 have no objection to having that property sold at that point — 
5 at this time, is my — 
6 THE COURT: Is there a homestead exemption that's been 
7 declared and filed on that property? 
8 MR. MILLER: As I understand, your Honor, yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
10 MR. MILLER: So in summary — 
11 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. (Inaudible) . I will now 
12 hear from Mr. White. 
13 MR. MILLER: Can I make a summary, your Honor? 
14 THE COURT: No. 
15 MR. MILLER: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: I think you've pretty well (inaudible). 
17 MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor, and I compliment 
18 Mr. Miller for doing his homework on this case. I would like 
19 to add a couple of facts that he has left out. In particular 
20 he has indicated that the law is that the homestead exemption, 
21 as powerful as it might be cannot: be used to offset or take 
22 preference to a lien that's already recorded on the property. 
23 I read most of the cas^s that he cited. I really don't have 
24 much dispute. His interpretation I think is a little off on a 
25 few of them, but let me just indicate a couple of facts to the 
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1 Court, and I think that we can straighten that out. 
2 Number one, as to his question about the judgment of 
3 $271,000, if Mr. Miller adds up the amounts owed to my clients, 
4 which are in the judgment, Jerry Houghton and Sue Houghton were 
5 granted a judgment jointly and severely of $88,129. Mr. Thomas 
6 and Mrs. Thomas, Marlene and Kendall, were granted a judgment 
7 of $183,269, which roughly figured $271,000 with the interest 
8 up to that point m time. 
9 Addressing the motion to set aside the judgment, I 
10 don't believe anything in there is justification at this point 
11 in time to have it set aside. The Court correctly stated that 
12 all of the communications and pleadings and whatnot that went 
13 on before were sent to Mr. Atkm, his attorney. The Court 
14 cited correctly that Mr. Atkm made a response to the summary 
15 judgment. The Court granted it under Rule 4.501. There was no 
16 irregularities there that I am aware of. Mr. Atkm withdrew 
17 about two weeKS later and since that time I've been sending 
18 everything to Mr. Miller. 
19 THE COURT: AnH I can make that ruling now. That is, 
20 I'll deny the motion to set aside the judgment based upon non-
21 service, given the fact that Counsel was present at the time, 
22 retained by Mr. Miller, and indeed filed motions m opposition 
23 to this question about judgment. 
24 MR. WHITE: Thank you. Now, addressing the homestead 
25 issues, Mr. Miller has been convicted of defrauding about 200 
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1 people to the tune of about 8 or $9,000,000. My judgments are 
2 part and parcel of that. The reason the summary judgment was 
3 m fact filed in the case originally was because he pled guilty 
4 to 10 or 11 counts of fraud. 
5 That conviction was entered m this Court through 
6 the summary judgment process, and hence, he is personally 
7 responsible for those amounts. I'm sure that he may not 
8 understand that amount. I think that's the basis of his res 
9 juste type of res judicata argument, but I think the Court 
10 will note that that is not exactly how that rule works. In 
i 
11 fact, the criminal case in that matter has also ordered 
12 restitution, and any one of those defendants purportedly at 
13 some point m time may go after his property. 
14 Here's the facts that the Court ought to know, that 
15 I'm sure that Mr. Miller is not aware of. First of all, when 
16 we filed — or I filed the complaint for the Houghtons and the 
17 Thomases, we also filed and obtained a motion for a prejudgment 
18 writ of attachment because of the allegations of fraud, and 
19 because Mr. Miller had filed and recorded with the County 
20 Recorder's Office a document indicating that he was no longer 
21 to be considered a resident of the State of Utah, and because 
22 he was charged with fraud, that gave Judge Young the basis to 
23 go ahead and grant a writ of attachment on the property -char — 
24 THE COURT: Whpn was that writ issued? 
25 MR. WHITE: Your Honor, the motion was filed m 
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November of 2000, and the order was actually signed 
of 2001. I have a copy of the order. 
THE COURT: I don't need that. 
MR. WHITE: Instead of looking through your 
was signed on April 17th, 2001 by Judge Young. 
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Apnl 17th 
file, it 
THE COURT: Why don't you give it to the bailiff and 
that way we'll at least have — 
MR. WHITE: Which includes the house he was currently 
residing m at 871 East Upland Drive, the 358 North house, and 
the little piece of property that there's nothing on. It's 
virtually a weed patch in an alleyway. 
We know that, and I purport to the Court that those 
were the properties that I worked with the SEC attorneys to 
exclude from their case in Salt Lake. They did not trace any 
funds of his fraud to those properties, and those properties 
were solely in his name. Not even his wife's name were on 
them. 
So we asked the Court m this County to issue that 
writ. Because of all of the problems that Mr. Miller had, 
we wanred to make sure that those weren't deeded away or 
squandered away somehow in between. 
Now, that becomes of critical importance. I might 
add, the writ of attachment — that's the order, the writ of 
attachment which was filed with the Court as well. 
THE COURT: You're saying this prejudgment writ of 
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1 attachment was first in time over a homestead exemption. 
2 MR. WHITE: At that — 
3 THE COURT: And the homestead exemption is really being 
4 filed to defraud creditors. 
5 MR. WHITE: Well, I'm not sure that he understood the 
6 meaning of that. 
7 THE COURT: Sure. 
8 MR. WHITE: I'm not saying that he did that, but I am 
9 citing a corpus juris secundum in which it states, "Obligations 
10 existing prior to the establishment of the homestead right will 
11 not be defeated where the debtor subsequently claimed that the 
12 premise was his homestead." In fact, that case cited is the 
13 Chugg case, which is a Utah case. 
14 It further states that the rule — excuse me — that 
15 the exemption cannot be claimed as against valid liens which 
16 have attached to the premises before they are impressed with 
17 the homestead character, whether such liens are obtained by 
18 contract or by operation of law. 
19 I would suggest to the Court, and I have a reference 
20 for that, the rules applied in these cases of liens are created 
21 by — liens created by attachment. I have — 
22 THE COURT: Of course, this is a post-judgment — 
23 MR. WHITE: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: — attachment. 
25 MR. WHITE: And I have a case on that as well. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. WHITE: The Chugg case, which is an older case, 
3 simply states that existing liens on property cannot be 
4 defeated by subsequently claiming the property is a homestead. 
5 Now, that's important because what Mr. Miller said, he was 
6 living, his wife was living, all his dependents were living at 
7 8 91. There was a fire. They never fixed it up. Whatever the 
8 — it was later foreclosed upon. 
9 In fact, several months prior to that time he called 
10 me and asked me if I would subrogate our preattachment judge 
11 — or lien, so that he could go ahead and refinance the house. 
12 I agreed to do that. He tells me today for the first time 
13 that that actually never did take place, but we did sign the 
14 documents and whatnot, in fact, to do that. So our lien was on 
15 that house when he was living there with his wife and with his 
16 dependents. 
17 He tells me today he was actually incarcerated on 
18 March 27rh, 2002. Now, that date's important for obvious 
19 reasons. Our lien was against the house April 17tv, 2001, a 
20 year before he even went to jail, and he was still residing m 
21 that house. The house caught fire six months later, or seven 
22 months later m December, and in fact it was foreclosed on 
23 after that. 
24 Now, the important part is this. Mrs. Miller — well, 
25 let's make this point first Mr. Miller has never occupied 
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1 the premises. 
2 THE COURT: Right, and she wasn't occupying the 
3 premises. 
4 MR. WHITE: And she wasn't occupying the premises and 
5 she took occupancy approximately about three months ago, m 
6 May. 
7 MR. MILLER: No. 
8 MR. WHITE: May, June, July, approximately three months 
9 ago she took occupancy. He told me that they started fixing it 
10 up sometime last September. It doesn't matter which date you 
11 take. The lien was still on there two years ago, and that lien 
12 trumps the homestead filing of March. There's no doubt about 
13 it. 
14 THE COURT: Is it the Chugg case that you used for 
15 support on this, or is it some other case for a prejudgment 
16 writ of attachment? 
17 MR. WHITE: That's another case, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okc.y. While — I'd like to cite one other 
19 one before I get to that, on the occupancy, because that is 
20 interrelated with it. The Sanders versus Sanders case, which 
21 is a Utah case, specifically talks about occupancy and the 
22 homestead, and I'm quoting, "It is the occupancy of the 
23 premises that gives rise to the homestead claim." They must 
24 occupy it m order to make the claim. 
25 The prejudgment writ is the case of Ephraim versus 
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1 Davis, which is a 1978 case, and I'm citing — and I'm quoting 
2 here now. It says, "In the instant case, upon issuance and 
3 service of the writ of attachment the defendant creditor was 
4 deprived of significant property interest. The constructive 
5 seizure by the sheriff encumbered the property with the lien 
6 of attachment and inhibited defendant's right to dispose or 
7 encumber of its assets." 
8 Now, I can tell you m this case they did let the 
9 homestead come m , but only because the sheriff didn't do 
10 the service correctly, and they got rid of the lien, but the 
11 premise — the principal is the same, that that is a lien that 
12 would m fact be first in time, first in right, and that's the 
13 basis of that case. 
14 Furthermore on that case it says, "The prejudgment 
15 remedy of attachment allows the deprivation of the property. 
16 The debtor's property is therefore subject to the principals 
17 embodied," and it goes on. 
18 Now, let me talk about the smaller piece of property. 
19 There's a small piece of property over off of Mam, It's only 
20 access is through a back alleyway. It is 43 feet by 190, I 
21 bell eve. Also in agreement with Mr. Miller that that case or 
22 that — there's not a house on it. 
23 Although the code allows people to select m more than 
24 one location, the cases are very clear on that, that m fact 
25 the property, if it's appurtenant to — doesn't mean attached 
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1 to. Could be m different areas — has to be m some way 
2 related to the maintenance or the support of the family. 
3 This little piece of property is m the back of an 
4 alleyway. It's a weed patch right now. It should have been 
5 oiled over. Mr. Miller had an interest m the building that 
6 attaches this property that the SEC took and it's behind 
7 another person's house right now. It has never been leased 
8 for money. It's never been rented for money. There is no way 
9 possible to claim in either instance that this comes under the 
10 homestead exemptions, =md we would ask the Court that it not be 
11 included. 
12 Now, Mr. Miller in his declaration actually filed by 
13 his wife — the Court have a copy of that with his motion — 
14 claims the house is worth $85,000. Our judgment is $260,000. 
15 Even if the Court found that there was some homestead exemption 
16 there, my clients would be entitled to the excess amount. To 
17 that there is no question. 
18 I do challenge Mrs. Miller's calculation. The current 
19 statute which was amended in 2000 allows, and only allows 
20 $20,000 per individual. Now, if individual is defined as the 
21 credit — or the debtor, which Mr. Miller is, not Mrs. Miller, 
22 then they're really only entitled m my view to $20,000, but m 
23 fairness and candidness to the Court as well, I found one case 
24 that said if she was m possession of iz, even though she's not 
25 on the title of it, m the liberal construction of it, zhe 
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1 Courts would probably grant her an exemption as well, giving 
2 them 40, totally maximum, but she did not take possession of 
3 the house, and mark it or impress it with the homestead until 
4 after that house caught fire and was foreclosed on. Clearly 
5 about two years difference. 
6 I observed the house before I filed the motion in 
7 November of 2000. It was totally dilapidated, had been an 
8 older rental house, the doors m the front and the back were 
9 totally open on it. No one was residing there, really, at all, 
10 and I don't know that anybody's been in there since they've 
11 tried to go in and fix it up now for her. 
12 The point there being at the time our prejudgment 
13 lien was filed, it was not a homestead to the Millers, period. 
14 Likewise, the little piece of property m the alleyway was not 
15 either, and that should not be considered as a homestead as 
16 well. 
17 I have with me today and I would proffer as testimony 
18 an attorney that deals with these exemptions in bankruptcy 
19 Court routinely, and he is Mr. Kurt Morris, he would hear — 
20 he is here and he would testify that the exemption is $40,000 
21 max per household. 
22 What they did is calculate $20,000 per individual, but 
23 they included m their calculation all the children. Under the 
24 new statute amendments of 2000 that's no longer permissible. 
25 What they did is increase the exemption from $10,000 to $20,000 
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a 
that 78-23-3(2)(a)(l), which indicates there is a $40,000 
maximum exemption there. I would also cite the Homeside 
versus Miller case, which indicates the maximum would be 
$40,000. 
So all in all, your Honor, we have a very valid 
prejudgment writ of attachment. It's that which we wish to 
proceed on when this was started. I have a copy of — maybe 
I gave it to you — the title report. Did you have that, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Oh, yes, I do. The list of lien holders 
and — 
MR. WHITE: Showing that — yeah. Showing that the 
writ was filed and recorded with the courthouse about two years 
before this house ever came on the radar screen as far as being 
a Homestead Act, and I would suggest to the Court that the 
Court rule in fact that the prejudgment writ of attachment is 
not affected by the Homestead Act. My clients have the right 
to sell this house and the other little piece of property m an 
attempt to try and recoup some of their $271,000. 
I appreciate Mr. Miller's response to this matter, but 
I think that he just doesn't understand the fact that m 
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1 Utah, first in time, first in right. I don't see any other 
2 reasonable interpretation of the time periods and the way the 
3 law works with liens and homesteads that I could suggest to the 
4 Court that would construe that statute any other way, and we 
5 would ask the Court to permit us to go ahead, readvertise and 
6 go ahead with the sell. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. This is what the Court's going to 
8 do, based upon the arguments today. 
9 MR. MILLER: Can I get — your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. MILLER: May I add something to what he has said? 
12 THE COURT: How much of a something do you want to add? 
13 MR. MILLER: Well, some of the things that he stated as 
14 facts that I'd like to clarify and — 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Let's make it — let's make it 
16 quick. 
17 MR. MILLER: Okay, he stated that I have been convicted 
18 of defrauding people. That is not correct, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Well, you pled guilty to — 
20 MR. MILLER: I pled guilty — I did not plead guilty to 
21 defrauding any people. I have an affidavit which I filed m 
22 the Court in Salt Lake that I have — happen to have a copy of 
23 it today that I could proffer here as evidence pertaining to 
24 the things which he has stated. 
25 As far as restitution, there was an order of the Court 
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1 that said "restitution as necessary/' There was no amount 
2 of restitution ordered. 38 — or 78-38 — or 77-38(a)-302 
3 specifies how to determine restitution. I have not agreed to 
4 any amount of restitution in that case. There are issues in my 
5 affidavit which would address that, if the Court would want me 
6 to go over it now or not as far as being responsible. 
7 The law states that if the criminal conviction 
8 specifically assigns liability that is applicable in a civil 
9 case. The things which I pled guilty to, I did not plead 
10 guilty, and in my plea I did not agree to pay restitution to 
11 all of the victims that had been listed and had been talked to 
12 by the prosecutor. 
13 In my plea agreement I agreed to state, and it is 
14 stated in the plea agreement that I would make restitution 
15 to the parties of the lawsuit. The parties in the lawsuit 
16 were the State of Utah and Glen E. Miller. I agreed to that 
17 restitution for the fact that that is who the parties were. 
18 In the preliminary hearing I was questioning Mr. Houghton 
19 pertaining to the loss of money and how he had gotten a 
20 judgment, and the Judge said, "Mr. Miller, Mr. Houghton is not 
21 a plaintiff in that, and you are not to discuss loss of money." 
22 THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Miller, you have to understand 
23 that individual parties can't bring criminal actions against 
24 people. The State does, and the State represents the people. 
25 MR. MILLER: I understand, but this is — this case, 
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1 the prosecutor stated that the victim was the State, and I have 
2 that in my affidavit. 
3 THE COURT: Well, the victim represent — the victims 
4 are represented by the State. 
5 MR. MILLER: Okay, and so there's an issue there still 
6 pertaining to the restitution amount. The prejudgment writ of 
7 attachment, let's — okay. My wife moved into the house in 
8 March, okay? Which was prior to the post-judgment time. The 
9 judgment was not awarded until April 10th. I did not even know 
10 until, like I said, I received the writ of execution, that 
11 there was even a judgment. 
12 A prejudgment writ of attachment, while I am not fully 
13 versed in title and claims, that is a pre-writ. That is not a 
14 lien that has been adjudicated, as was stated in — against the 
15 property until April 10th, when that claim would become official 
16 and adjudicated. 
17 I would also like to say that, you know, this — in 
18 this case to awarding the execution of the writ of execution, 
19 and continuing on with that, is just like having a person who 
20 gives up 20 years of her life to have — raise a family, to 
21 raise — to support her husband, and then all of a sudden he is 
22 — you know, he abandons her, and if he abandons her and then 
23 she is left with nothing, and then they come in and sell the 
24 house which she has and has been awarded by this Court as 
25 alimony, to kicking her our on the street and saying, nHere is 
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1 $40,000, whatever, for your inconvenience, and we're sorry." 
2 Furthermore, it does authorize that the wife, and the 
3 spouse may assert the homestead claim as well, on behalf of the 
4 husband and the family, in Section 12. I think I have a copy 
5 of the — 
6 THE COURT: Well, the statute is quite clear that the 
7 maximum amount is $40,000. 
8 MR. MILLER: Yes, but the statute is also very clear 
9 — and the Tenth Circuit Court making it also clear that a writ 
10 of — or that a judgment of judicial lien does not attach to a 
11 homestead, and that a homestead, not a homestead amount, is not 
12 subject to the levy, as also is the alimony as well. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay, thank you, Mr. Miller. As 
14 to the motion to set aside the judgment, I've already ruled 
15 on that particular issue. Mr. White, if you'll prepare the 
16 order. 
17 This Court's going to find that the maximum amount 
18 per household is $40,000 in this case. So I'd limit any 
19 right of homestead to $40,000. I'll also find for purposes 
20 of findings that the writ of attachment was filed somewhere 
21 in the neighborhood of two years prior to the filing of the 
22 homestead lien. 
23 Be that as it may, the Court's going to take at 
24 least the opportunity to look at Ephraim versus Davis and 
25 Sanders versus Sanders to see what it says associated with a 
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1 prejudgment writ of attachment acting as the appropriate lien 
2 that might otherwise be reflected in the homestead exemption. 
3 So that I might make a determination associated with whether 
4 or not a writ of attachment, as you have represented it to be, 
5 acts in the case of cutting off any claim for a homestead 
6 exemption. I'm going to ask Ms. Walton ultimately to look at 
7 that particular issue. 
8 So I will give that file to you to check. I know that 
9 probably gives you, Mr. White, some heartburn associated with 
10 under advisement, sine** you and I have a matter that's under 
11 advisement that we've been attempting to get in touch with you 
12 about on that other matter; Iverson versus Iverson. 
13 MR. WHITE: Yes. 
14 (Court addresses issue unrelated to this case.) 
15 THE COURT: I do understand that it is a matter that is 
16 still on my desk and it will be off my desk by the end of this 
17 week, as well as this one. So Mr. Miller, I appreciate your 
18 arguments today. I would also say that I appreciated reading 
19 your materials, because it was well done. 
20 You've represented yourself better than the lawyer who 
21 you asked to represent you, but I held the motion no set aside 
22 a judgment, I denied that motion based upon the fact that you 
23 had a Counsel representing you. Whether he was communicating 
24 or not communicating with you at that time, he was still a 
25 lawyer of record who had also filed an objection to "chis very 
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1 motion, and simply didn't keep you in that particular loop. 
2 On the issue associated with the writ of execution, 
3 I've taken that issue under advisement, having limited the 
4 upper amount of $40,000 to it, to simply whether or not the 
5 writ of attachment exists. 
6 As to the other property, that property is subject to 
7 execution, the smaller parcel, based upon the arguments of 
8 Counsel today. So the only issue that I have is whether or not 
9 having looked at Chugg and Sanders a prejudgment writ of 
10 I attachment is first in time over a homestead exemption. 
11 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, what about pertaining to the 
12 exemption for alimony? 
13 THE COURT: I've ruled on that. My ruling is it's 
14 not appropriate or applicable based upon the way I read the 
15 statute. Okay, thank you. 
16 MR. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 I (Hearing concluded.) 
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m THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN : 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, : 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 : ORDER GRANTING 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, : HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
Plaintiff, : 
: Case No. 000301127 
vs. : 
GLEN E. MILLER, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant, : 
This matter came on for hearing on various motions on August 4,2003. Mr. 
Douglas F. White representing plaintiffs and Glen E. Miller appearing pro se. After a 
review of the pleadings, case law, and argument of the parties, the court finds and orders 
as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in 
question and was granted on March 26,2001. 
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen Miller in this matter. 
3. Lori Miller, the wife of defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subject 
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or 
May of 2003. 
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4. A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1,2003, and a sale of the property 
subject to execution was scheduled for July 23,2003. 
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution and the court 
ordered a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
The court notes that the case of Sanders v. Cassitv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978) is 
dispositive on the issue of whether a homestead exemption may defeat a pre-existing Writ 
of Attachment or other judgment on the property claimed under the homestead exemption. 
Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et. seq., and the Sanders 
decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment and before sale. 
Plaintifrs argument that a prejudgment Writ of Attachment, (or judgment for that matter) 
filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared, compromised 
the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was to the Utah 
Supreme Court twenty five years ago. That court opined back then that f l . . . the 
homestead exemption is immune from judgment lien, execution or forced sale, providing a 
formal declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or 
execution." Id. at 426 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even though the Millers may not 
have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute neither requires such in 
order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes that occupancy is 
unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963) 
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QRDER 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the subject property, 358 North 100 
East, Tooele, Utah, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and 
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii). Mr. White to 
prepare the order consistent with this decision. 
Dated this *7 day of August, 2003. 
Randall N. STcanchy 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs , 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
C # 
Case No. 000301127 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
December 4, 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE 
3282 South Sunset Hollow Dr. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435)843-9399 
JUDSON T. PITTS 
(Address not provided) 
(Phone number not provided) 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
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, 2003) 
All right. We'll call the matter of 
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1 THE COURT: But I know there are other motions that 
2 have been filed, including a motion or request that I take 
3 judicial notice of various items. 
4 MR. PITTS: Sure. 
5 THE COURT: That may simply be a reflection of somebody 
6 trying to practice law who has never been through law school 
7 training, but having said that, seemed to have done a pretty 
8 good job of representing himself so far. 
9 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I'd like to beg the Court's 
10 indulgence at this time for my client that he might have one 
11 hand free so that he can take some notes. 
12 THE COURT: That's not up to me. That's up to the 
13 officers in the courtroom today. 
14 OFFICER: If it's up to us, the answer is no. 
15 THE COURT: What I ask is do you have any objection to 
16 that? If you don't, then — well, let's just do this. Let's 
17 free one hand, whichever hand he uses to write with. 
18 MR. MILLER: P-ght. 
19 THE COURT: I've always considered the security of the 
20 courtroom to be not the province of the Judge but the province 
21 of the security officers in the courtroom. 
22 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, it appears that my client, 
23 the defendant, has issued a motion or made a motion to object 
24 to the levy and the execution that has been issued by the 
25 plaintiffs in this case, based upon his — the granting by 
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1 this Court of the homestead exemption back on August 4th, I 
2 believe it was, of this year, in that hearing when that came 
3 before the Court. We would like at this time to go ahead and 
4 make some oral argument about that to clarify our position. 
5 THE COURT: Go ahead, certainly. You might best be 
6 served by standing at the lectern so that — 
7 MR. PITTS: (Inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: — for purposes of the record it would be 
9 better recorded that way. 
10 MR. PITTS: My client has gone ahead and moved in 
11 this case according to the Utah Constitutional provision on 
12 homestead, Article 22, Section 1, your Honor, and also pursuant 
13 to Utah Code 78-23-3, that the statutory language in that 
14 situation be read liberally — be construed liberally, to allow 
15 him to exclude his homestead. 
16 Now, I understand there are more than — there is more 
17 than one parcel of land that is involved in this case that he 
18 would like to exclude his homestead and also the other parcel 
19 of land using various statutory provisions from forced sale and 
20 the execution of levy in this case. 
21 Your Honor, we would go ahead and enter in argument 
22 at this time that the provisions of the code that provide — 
23 apply to the homestead exemption as it is set forth apply in 
24 a setting that is for bankruptcy law. 
25 We would like to go ahead and move at this time that 
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1 the homestead definition as it is put forth in statutory 
2 language should be interpreted differently in this situation, 
3 should be distinguished from the context of a bankruptcy 
4 proceeding. 
5 That the statutory language should be read more 
6 liberally to protect the actual physical structure of the 
7 homestead in this situation, as differentiated from the 
8 bankruptcy. 
9 Now, it's my understanding in a bankruptcy proceeding 
10 that it is common practice, your Honor, to go ahead and grant 
11 the exemption up to $20,000 per person in the household, which 
12 would give a total monetary exemption on the homestead of 
13 $40,000, and that the rest of the — the actual physical 
14 structure would be subject to a creditor's lien, and would be 
15 able to be sold at execution in a sheriff's sale; and that the 
16 proceeds from the sale up to $40,000 would be given over to the 
17 defendants or the debtors in that situation. 
18 We enter an argument at this time that that does 
19 not apply in this proceeding. That this proceeding is a 
20 Constitutional proceeding, based on an older law and an older 
21 law and an older interpretation of homestead outside of that 
22 context of bankruptcy, and that the entire structure at this 
23 time is not subject to a forced sale. 
24 We use case law, your Honor, to back up and to support 
25 our point. First off I'd like to say Russell M. Miller Company 
1 versus Given, the citation in that case, your Honor — 
2 THE COURT: I have it. 
3 MR. PITTS: You have the citation. That exemption 
4 statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor 
5 to protect he and his family. We also would like to cite 
6 Folson versus Asper as one of the first cases to deal with 
7 homestead at the beginning of this century, that all laws of 
8 the homestead should be liberally construed to protect it and 
9 make it effective for the dependent and the helpless, to insure 
10 their shelter and their support. 
11 Now, defendant recognizes at this point, your Honor, 
12 that the exemption as it was created and cut out has changed 
13 over time by legislative change, but we would also like to 
14 recognize that the amount — monetary amount of the homestead 
15 exemption in times past historically have been enough to cover 
16 the value of most homesteads. 
17 As that law has evolved, your Honor, we understand 
18 that the price most homesteads in equity has exceeded the 
19 value of the homestead exemption for Utah. I understand 
20 in a national context that this state has one of the lowest 
21 thresholds of any state in the country at this time monetarily 
22 for a homestead exemption. 
23 Regardless of that argument, and also recognizing, 
24 your Honor, that the homestead exemption law in this state 
25 was altered just six years ago in 1996 by the legislature, 
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1 that the values were changed, that this was dealt with by the 
2 legislature in terms of legislative history, again, the last 
3 40 years of homestead law have been almost exclusively caught 
4 up in creditor/debtor situations in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
5 Now, one of the cases that I wanted to cite as well, 
6 your Honor, that I think will help clarify my argument, will 
7 be — well, first off, I wanted to go ahead and ask the Court 
8 to take notice of the definition of Black's Law Dictionary on 
9 homestead. That is that the house out-buildings and adjoining 
10 land owned and occupied by a person or family as a primary 
11 residence, Black's Law Dictionary speaks of the house, the 
12 out-buildings, the adjoining land as being a part of the 
13 homestead. 
14 We argue that when the cases and the statutory 
15 language that has been set forth in not only Black's Law 
16 Dictionary, but also in the statute 78-23-3, when it talks 
17 about a homestead being exempted, we contend that the exemption 
18 that that statutory language is talking about isn't the 
19 monetary value that is exempted from the forced sale. 
20 THE COURT: If the statute so designates, it's only 
21 exempt up to a certain monetary value. 
22 MR. PITTS: We understand that, but we would like to 
23 submit that that is in the bankruptcy proceeding. We would 
24 like to submit that that applies only to bankruptcy cases and 
25 it does not apply to situations where a debtor has not filed 
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1 for bankruptcy and is not in the course of liquidating his 
2 assets to satisfy all lien creditors that have come against 
3 him. 
4 THE COURT: Has there been any case in the State of 
5 Utah limiting this particular statute only to a bankruptcy 
6 proceeding? 
7 MR. PITTS: The cases that I have, your Honor, to cite 
8 in that context — of course, the older cases that I've already 
9 provided for; Folson and I'd also present McMurray versus Chugg 
10 as a case that was not in that context. They talked about the 
11 beneficient purpose of securing and protecting family's home 
12 against creditors. 
13 Okay. Now, I would submit to the Court that the 
14 language that's used in those cases — and these are outside 
15 of bankruptcy proceeding cases — talk about securing the home 
16 against attack by creditors. It talks about protecting minor 
17 children. It talks about giving support to those people. 
18 THE COURT: The statute itself has a cap at which that 
19 protection ends, and that cap is set forth in a monetary value. 
20 MR. PITTS: Okay. Well, Your Honor, the basis of my 
21 argument revolves around this being a property interest, as a 
22 Constitutional matter, and not being an interest in a monetary 
23 value. I would like to make the argument that due process 
24 attaches in this kind of a situation. It would be actually a 
25 violation of due process in a Constitutional manner to go ahead 
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1 and take away the physical home, the physical structure, in 
2 granting this exemption. 
3 My client and his spouse did apply for a homestead 
4 exemption in this case, and in that context they were asking 
5 for the monetary relief in that situation, but what my client 
6 also moved for in that situation, he moved for the protection 
7 of a due process protection. A Constitutional protection 
8 that's given under the United — or the Utah Constitution. 
9 Now, I understand that there is not a Utah case 
10 exactly on point in this situation. It is to be inferred by 
11 language in those cases and also through the statutory law 
12 that's been given, that it is the physical structure that is 
13 protected through due process that he has a right to protect 
14 and give shelter to his family and to his minor children that 
15 are at home, rather than the money that is associated. 
16 It is possible, perhaps, on a forced sale for him to 
17 go out and to find a home for his family for $40,000 in this 
18 kind of situation, but I'm contending that that's not what the 
19 legislative intent — not the policy that these legislators had 
20 in mind when they passed this Constitutional provision. That's 
21 why if in fact it's Constitutional. 
22 THE COURT: If I could synthesize your argument, 
23 what you're really saying is in the State of Utah under this 
24 homestead exemption, if someone claims it, that takes their 
25 home, whatever equity, whatever value may exist, and makes it 
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1 free and clear, despite the caps that have been set forth in 
2 the statute of any judgment, of any judgment creditor. If 
3 this is a homestead exemption, it would fly against every 
4 debtor/creditor relationship that exists in the state. 
5 MR. PITTS: You know, your Honor, I — 
6 THE COURT: There is an ability for somebody to say, 
7 "My home is my castle, and therefore I may do whatever I'll 
8 do to incur debt in whatever fashion I do so, but you can't 
9 touch this," and that's what I read these caps to be. You 
10 can't touch it up to $40,000, so that at least somebody can 
11 use that exemption for purposes of finding suitable alternative 
12 habitation. 
13 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I would — 
14 THE COURT: No one — no one — it's not your argument. 
15 It sounds like it is. It sounds like your argument is simply 
16 this. A man's home is his castle. It's exempt from judgment 
17 creditors if the homestead exemption is declared, and can't be 
18 touched whether it has a value of $10,000 or $750,000. 
19 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I agree with the Court's 
20 summation of my argument with the exception that in the 
21 bankruptcy proceeding there are cases that set forth that the 
22 exemption that's granted is an allowance for that. In other 
23 words, in that context they are allowed to have $40,000 or 
24 $20,000 a person as an exemption, in liquidating all of their 
25 other assets. 
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1 McMurty versus Chuggs set forth that the homestead is 
2 a benefit to those people to protect that castle. In other 
3 words it's a reward for those debtors and creditors who do not 
4 take the steps in filing for bankruptcy. 
5 What I'm — the policy argument that I'm making, 
6 your Honor, is that folks who have the integrity, debtors who 
7 remain and keep the integrity of not declaring bankruptcy to 
8 their creditors, that is a show of good faith on their part, 
9 regardless of the circumstances that they would like to go 
10 ahead and repay their debts. 
11 Now, in my defendant's particular case that might be a 
12 lot of debts, your Honor. I understand you've overseen other 
13 cases that my defendant has come before you on, but still — 
14 THE COURT: I actually haven't seen anything. 
15 MR. PITTS: Regardless — regardless of that history, 
16 your Honor, he has not taken that step. He has shown good 
17 faith in his situation. I feel at this time that, you know, 
18 as a reward for that, that his wife and his minor children 
19 should be granted the opportunity to stay in their home and 
20 to not be subject to forced sale, and that the words of the 
21 statute should be read as to differentiate between the 
22 exemption and the homestead, and that the homestead itself 
23 in this situation is a due process Constitutional Right, 
24 should be exempt from forced sale. 
25 THE COURT: Let me come back and ask this question. Is 
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1 there any case that you can cite to this Court in the State of 
2 Utah that indicates that this exemption merely acts as a lien 
3 and the property is not subject, of course, to sale. 
4 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I can submit a case again. It 
5 is an older case because I feel that the cases from the last 50 
6 years have all been in the bankruptcy proceeding context, but I 
7 do go ahead and cite Kimball versus Salisbury. That's 17 Utah 
8 381-53-P-1037. It's an 1898 case. I also believe that you 
9 could find that we support for that position in the 
10 Folson/Asper case. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's hear from Mr. White. 
12 MR. WHITE: By way of clarification I believe the 
13 defendant's motion is simply to object to the order — 
14 THE COURT: And I understand that, but — 
15 MR. WHITE: — for the record. 
16 THE COURT: — Mr. Miller hasn't been represented 
17 by Counsel, and I'm going to give Counsel latitude to make 
18 whatever arguments need to be made, including what this is, 
19 is in essence a reconsideration of the Court's prior argument 
20 — or prior ruling. So give him some latitude here, based upon 
21 the fact that he's not been represented. 
22 MR. WHITE: Thank you. I understand Mr. Miller's 
23 argument, and I'm looking at the document he submitted on 
24 October the 9th, 2003. 
25 THE COURT: What's that entitled? 
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1 MR. WHITE: It's entitled, "Request for judicial notice 
2 of homestead," which I take as supplemental to his objections 
3 to my order. In addressing Counsel's argument, and I expect 
4 Mr. Miller's idea of protecting the residence, the physical 
5 structure from the execution, and to redefine what a homestead 
6 is, instead of taking Black's Law, we've got to stick with the 
7 statutory definition, which is set forth in Title 78-23 — 
8 THE COURT: Let me just ask a question. Now, this 
9 Chugg case, McMurty case, and the language associated with 
10 those cases all suggest that the homestead exemption exists for 
11 purposes of protecting it from being subject to judicial sale. 
12 Is this statute a subsequent codification of legislature's 
13 issues, intent and otherwise? 
14 MR. WHITE: Well, I don't believe — I think they're 
15 mutually exclusive. I think the case the Court is looking for 
16 is here; 19 — the Gilroy case versus Lowe. I'm citing from 
17 that case, which was exactly the same issue being raised here 
18 that I researched — 
19 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
20 MR. WHITE: Exactly, as whether or not the physical 
21 structure is safe from the sale as opposed to just the value of 
22 the exemption, and here's what the case says. "The appellants 
23 interest in the home therefore exceeds the value of amount of 
24 the homestead exemption. A sale is not prohibited in these 
25 circumstances." 
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judgment 
MR. WHITE: "The appellant was the homestead claimant." 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WHITE: The appellant's interest in the home — 
and one of the things that probably should have been done is 
they have some duty to establish what that is. I've talked to 
Counsel this morning and by stipulation we're going to submit 
to the Court the tax assessment, which puts the value at — 
I've marked this as Exhibit 1 — $200,099. 
Now, the reason for that is somewhat important. 
Number 1, there is case law that says that if the amount of 
the homestead exemption is below the value of what might be 
received out of the house — 
THE COURT: You're not able to sell it. 
MR. WHITE: — you're not able to sell it. 
THE COURT: That is the one exception. That is not the 
case here. The homestead exemption is $40,000; 20 for each. 
The value of the home, according to that recent tax thing — we 
think that's a little high — is over — is $200,000. There is 
ample equity or value in the house to sell it. 
-15-
1 Let me continue with the Gilroy case. This Court 
2 stated that when a claim of homestead is made, a judgment 
3 creditor is entitled — my clients — to any excess above the 
4 value constituting the homestead right. 
5 Furthermore, the homestead exemption is not a bar to 
6 execution in the present case. Assignee Federal Leasing, Inc. 
7 bid in $100,000 of the judgment against the appellants and paid 
8 to the sheriff on behalf of the appellants the $8,000 that was 
9 their homestead exemption. 
10 The Court ruled correctly that appellants were not 
11 entitled to claim the protection of the homestead exemption 
12 to set aside the execution of the sale. This is the case. 
13 This is the ruling. This is a good case. It's never been 
14 overturned. It's a 1981 case. 
15 The only thing that's been modified in that statute, 
16 according to my research, your Honor, is how to calculate what 
17 the exemptions were. I found no case that would say that this 
18 is simply limited to bankruptcy. 
19 Frankly, even in bankruptcy once the exemption is 
20 fixed, the property is abandoned, they sell it, with the 
21 proceeds going back into the estate — well, I shouldn't say 
22 that, but they're exempt for the creditor. 
23 So even under Counsel's argument of dealing with this 
24 differently, that should not work in this Court, because that's 
25 not what the law says. 
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1 The physical structure itself is only exempt from 
2 execution of sale unless it is worth less than what the 
3 exemption amount is, and in this case that is simply not the 
4 case. Looking at the proposed order that I have submitted to 
5 the Court — 
6 THE COURT: Hang on, let me get that so that I'm 
7 looking at it with you. 
8 MR. WHITE: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: Order on motion to determine homestead 
10 exemption; is that what it's entitled? 
11 MR. WHITE: It says, "Order on hearing on writ of 
12 execution granting homestead exemption" submitted September 22. 
13 Has findings and conclusions on it. 
14 THE COURT: I have it. 
15 MR. WHITE: Going back a couple of months the defendant 
16 submitted some other objections, which frankly a few of those I 
17 did incorporate into the current order before the Court, but 
18 the last round that he submitted, as far as I can tell, did not 
19 address anything further in the order, but rather argued, "You 
20 can't sell the structure." So I think that's where we're at 
21 right now. 
22 We would ask the Court to sign the order. I believe 
23 it comports with what the Court has said. Unless Mr. Miller 
24 has objections that can state to the Court at this time of why 
25 certain paragraphs should not be in there, we would like to get 
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1 this order signed. 
2 We believe that my clients are entitled to whatever 
3 proceeds there are over $40,000, and when we were here before, 
4 Mr. Miller I believe agreed that the other little piece of 
5 property was — could be sold. Now I hear Counsel arguing 
6 today it shouldn't be, but the Court ordered it sold before. 
7 There was not a homestead on it. That is in the order in that 
8 relationship, and we would submit it based upon that. 
9 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, just a few minutes for 
10 rebuttal? 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
12 MR. PITTS: The case that Counsel — plaintiff's 
13 Counsel relies on, Gilroy versus Lowe, for setting out the law, 
14 we believe in this situation may be distinguished, your Honor. 
15 The language that plaintiff's Counsel set before the Court did 
16 include the language in this case, in terms of allowing the 
17 sale of the home. 
18 We believe that in Gilroy versus Lowe there was — 
19 the facts of that case distinguish it f rom this one in that 
20 it was brought up entirely as a defense in that situation; the 
21 homestead exemption from the sale, and there were no — there 
22 was no protection. There was no family to protect. 
23 The justification in raising the defense wasn't 
24 according to the statutory language, and the earlier case law 
25 language that held that the reason in a Constitutional setting 
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1 that the home should be protected from forced sale is to 
2 protect those of the family that's at home, to allow them to 
3 stay there. We believe that in the Gilroy setting that that 
4 didn't apply to this situation. 
5 My client is raising this as an argument for his 
6 children, for the best interests of his children. I dare say 
7 that in this proceeding that they not only have an interest in 
8 this proceeding in terms of this home being sold because of 
9 their livelihood, the place where they live. It's possible 
10 that they might be able to find an apartment or they may be 
11 able to find some other place to live within the area, but I 
12 can't see in this proceeding how the best interests of the 
13 children cannot be taken into consideration when looking at the 
14 forced sale of this structure. 
15 Also, I understand that since a homestead exemption 
16 has been granted to the defendant's spouse, the defendant's 
17 spouse is not represented here as a part of this proceeding, 
18 and under Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of — I'm sorry, 19 of the 
19 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure she would be an indispensable 
20 party to the order of the forced sale or allowing the execution 
21 on this property, because of her interest that's been granted. 
22 In other situations where there is an interest that 
23 has been granted, I understand that the procedure used to 
24 be that the interest of the defendant had been sold in the 
25 property in those situations, but not the actual structure, and 
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1 that the minor children were allowed to live in the structure 
2 until the time that they reached the age of majority. All of 
3 those rights come from a Constitutional Right in the property. 
4 That's — and that further supports our argument. 
5 Now, in the McMurty versus Chugg that we're relying 
6 on also has language, your Honor, that we believe supports 
7 and bolsters our point as much as the Gilroy case supports 
8 plaintiff's Counsel. 
9 In McMurty/Chugg it lays out the language, "The Court 
10 rules that the head of a family may assert to prevent sale 
11 under execution of his homestead at any time before the sale 
12 of the premises, unless the claim against such property has 
13 been previously asserted and actually adjudicated against him." 
14 In that situation it actually talks, your Honor, and 
15 uses language that not just the exemption he may exert against, 
16 but he may assert to prevent the sale under execution of the 
17 entire structure. 
18 I Your Honor, we really honestly believe in this 
19 situation that although this may be a case of first impression 
20 before this Court for at least 40 or 50 years, that this is the 
21 path that this ought to take. That this case ought to receive 
22 a Constitutional consideration along the due process line for 
23 property rights, and should not — that homestead falls under 
24 those. We cite the Kimball case. 
25 We cite the Utah State Constitution, that this is a 
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1 Constitutional creation. Homestead simply isn't a mechanism of 
2 money that has evolved and come somehow. It has its roots in 
3 Constitution. It doesn't have its roots in creditor/debtor 
4 relationships. It doesn't have its roots in bankruptcy law. 
5 We assert that this is a case where we should go back to those 
6 roots. 
7 That we should go ahead and split the doctrine at this 
8 time on homestead. That there should be a line pertaining to 
9 those that declare bankruptcy, and that those are entitled only 
10 to keep the exemptions that they claim, and that those who do 
11 not declare bankruptcy should be considered outside of that 
12 scope, and that there is another body of law that this Court 
13 should consider in that situation, and that my defend — that 
14 the defendant's rights fall in that situation in this case, 
15 in order to protect his family, to protect his interest in 
16 his property, to protect his minor children in their best 
17 interests, and that this Court should not allow the forced 
18 sale, but should come up with a more creative solution in this 
19 situation that would allow my client, the defendant, to retain 
20 possession of his home. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. It appears 
22 from the plain reading of the statute that the exemption has a 
23 cap, and I see nothing in the order proposed by Counsel that 
24 appears objectionable. Nor have I heard any argument other 
25 than really reconsideration of the argument once provided by 
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1 Mr. Miller in some time past associated with exception to the 
2 order itself. 
3 Certainly the consequences associated with a number 
4 of activities that take place in debtor/creditor relationships 
5 accrue to the detriment of the parties who have the debt. This 
6 is one of those circumstances, and the legislature has made 
7 clear that that homestead exemption doesn't create an enviable 
8 castle, but it creates an enviable castle up to a certain 
9 interest amount. 
10 That interest amount is specifically set forth in the 
11 statute, and the Gilroy case seems to be apparent on its face 
12 to be applicable to this very case, and that is simply that 
13 forced sales may take place of a homestead exemption, with the 
14 homestead simply being the amount carved out and any potential 
15 equity in the home that's not available for attachment. 
16 Accordingly I'll grant the order. I think I have it 
17 here, but if you have a new one, I have one that's in my file 
18 and I'll sign it today. So this concludes this issue. 
19 MR. WHITE: I only have my copy, your Honor. I don't 
20 think it's an original. If not, I'll bring one up today. 
21 THE COURT: Well, let's see if it is. 
22 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, for the record, defense Counsel 
23 would like to object. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, I took that by way of your argument 
25 that you were objecting. 
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not 
copy 
need 
to do with it. The Exhibit No. 1 has been received as to the 
value that exists in excess of the homestead exemption. This 
Court's in recess. 
MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435)843-9399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENETHOMAS, and the 1995 ] 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant 
ORDER ON HEARING ON WRIT OF 
l EXECUTION GRANTING HOMESTEAD 
I EXEMPTION 
) Civil No;i00030H27 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
The Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Writ of Execution before the Honorable Randall N. 
Skanchy, Judge, on the 4* day of August, 2003; the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, was personally 
''present and represented himself; the Plaintiffs were all personally present and represented by 
Douglas F. -White, Attorney; and good cause appearing, therefore the Court enters the following 
Order: 
DEC-I* AM 10: 07 
FILED EY. 
1 
FINDINGS 
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in question and 
was granted on March 26,2001. 
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen E. Miller in this matter. 
3. Lori Miller, the wife of the Defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subj ect 
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or May of 2003. 
4. AWrit of Execution was issued on May 1,2003; and a sale of the property, subject 
to execution, was scheduled for July 23, 2003. 
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution, and the Court ordered 
a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. The matter was continued until August 4, 
2003. 
6. The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the two (2) real properties at 
artime when Defendant did not occupy either property as his residence, nor did any member of his 
family. 
7. On March 26,2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment became a lien against 
the following described two (2) parcels of real property, the Defendant's and his family's primary 
residence was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, which is not either of the two (2) real properties 
subject to this action: 
PARCEL NO. 1: Beginning 303jeet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26, 
Plat A, Tooele City Survey, running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; 
thence West 9feet; thence North 181.5feet; thence West 495feet; thence North 66.5 
2 
feet to point of beginning. Containing 0.77 acres. Parcel No. 02-42-14. 
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5, 
Block 41, Plat A, Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, running thence West 196.96 feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27. 
8. Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on March 27,2002. Thereafter, 
Defendant's wife started to repair the uninhabitable house (Parcel No. 1) to live in, and moved in 
approximately March ox May of 2003. The prejudgment lien was taken against Parcel No. 1 on 
March 26,2001. 
9. Thereafter, Defendant lost his primary residence, that being 891 Upland Drive, 
Tooele, Utah*through a mortgage foreclosure in approximately December 2002. 
1J0^  " Parcel No. 1, on March 26, 2001, was an old uninhabitable rental house that was 
vacant and had had no renters in it for some time. 
11. Parcel No. 2 is vacant ground, has no residence on it, and produces no income or 
support to the Defendant's family. 
12. There are no mortgages against either parcel of real property. 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
v13. The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the 
filing of a homestead declaration on March 26,2003. 
l C The amount of homesteacLexemption is $20,000.00 for Glen E. Miller and $20,000.00 
for Lori L. Miller, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2), U.C.A. as against Parcel No. 1. 
3 
12. Parcel No. 2 has no homestead exemption. 
13. The Plaintiffs shall renotice the Sheriffs Sale, which was previously stayed by the 
Court, and proceed with the sale of both parcels of real property, subject to this Order. 
DATED this j^£_ day of J lu^hm 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
RANDALL SKANCHT 
Judge 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
TO: GLEN E. MILLER 
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on 
4 
this 22nd day of September, 2003, to the following person( s): 
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042 
Defendant 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
It B&41 
SON, Legal Assistant 
5 
Addendum 12 
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